Economic Development and Democracy in South East Asia

Fadillah Putra
Public Administration Dept, Brawijaya University, Indonesia

Abstract

The debate about the relationship between democracy and economic development seems to have been reconciled by Gabriel Almond’s work, which states “that democracy and capitalism are both positively and negatively related, that they both support and subvert each other.” Yet, in recent literature the debate about the topic is not finished. This paper focuses specifically on how economic development affects democracy. Scholars such as Fish, Kwon, Mainwaring, Perez-Linan, Bellin, Przeworksi, and Limongi believe that, to a certain degree, economic development promotes democracy. On the other hand, Kwon explicitly rejects the possibility of contingency at the country level.

In order to measure the level of democracy, there are two independent variables in this research paper: Political Right (PR) and Civil Liberty (CL). Data for these two variables are taken from Freedom House in the World Historical Rankings Comparative Scores for all countries from 1973 to 2006. The data are ranked from 1 (very democratic) to 7 (very undemocratic), for both variables. The economic development indicators used in this research as the dependent variables are: GDP growth, GNI per capita, foreign investment, inflation rate, and trade. Data for those variables are taken from World Bank under WDI (World Development Index) dataset.

This paper concludes that the model of how economic development affects democracy works differently in countries studied. This is proof of how universalism (Fish and Bellin) and regionalism (Kwon, Przeworski and Limongi, and Mainwaring and Perez-Linan) do not apply in Southeast Asia.

Introduction

The debate about the relationship between democracy and economic development seems to have been reconciled by Gabriel Almond’s work, which states “that democracy and capitalism are both positively and negatively related, that they both support and subvert each other,” (Almond, 1991, p. 473). Yet in recent literature the debate about the topic is not finished. This paper focuses specifically on how economic development affects democracy. Scholars such as Fish, Kwon, Mainwaring, Perez-Linan, Bellin, Przeworksi and Limongi believe that, to a certain degree, economic development promotes democracy. Some believe that the correlation happens universally while others believe that it is regional. None of them argue that it not only varies from country to country but also from time to time. In fact, Kwon (2004) explicitly rejects the possibility of contingency at the country level. This paper mainly attempts to test the theory of economic development impact on democracy, specifically in Southeast Asia.

Most of literature about Southeast Asia mention the diversity of the region (Waddell, 1972; Pye, 1974; Quah, 1978).

Therefore, Southeast Asia is a very good region to test the “universality” and/or “regionality” of theories especially those related to the interaction between economic development and democracy. From eleven countries in the region, I choose only three of them which are Malaysia, Philippines and Thailand. The reason I chose these three is because although they have similarities, in the sense that they are anti-communist countries (three countries in Southeast Asia that are currently communist: Laos, Vietnam, and Burma), yet they have structural differences. Thailand has a strong history of monarchy and was never colonized, Philippines was colonized by three different countries (Spain, the US and Japan), and Malaysia is a British Commonwealth country.

This paper will be divided into six parts. Part one is the introduction. Part two presents a brief political history of each country researched. Part three elaborates on the theoretical framework of democracy and economic development. Part four is the methodology of the research. Part five is the findings (data and analysis). And the last part is the conclusion.

Historical Perspective

Malaysia

In this country democracy was first introduced by the British in 1955, by electing a local leader in Kuala Lumpur. Having had a good experience in that “trial” election, two years later, the first national election was held in order to
of BN. UMNO’s conservatism especially in terms of maintaining Malay nationalism and Islamic values triggers strong support in rural areas, at the same time, its success in modernizing the economy of Malaysia has elicited much support from the urban middle class (Neher et al., 1995).

Mahathir Mohammad, the fourth prime minister of Malaysia, who was in power for 22 years (1981 to 2003), was believed as the determinant of BN. This belief found the proof when in the same period of time when Mahathir’s popularity was declining (late 1990’s), BN’s percentage of seats in parliament also declined from 84.38% (1995 election) to 76.68% (1999 election). This also caused the percentage of seats for the opposition alliance’s, Barisan Alternatif/BA (Alternative Front), to increase from 15.62% (1995) to 23.32% (1999). However, this belief lost legitimacy in the 2004 election when BN won by landslide vote, up to 91%, which is the highest percentage vote in Malaysia’s history (Gomez, 2007).

In terms of the economic development, according to World Bank 2007 data, Malaysia is the 29th largest economy in the world with US $14,400 GDP per capita and 5%-7% economic growth. Malaysia has experienced this good standing of economic performance for quite a long time, except for two interruptions in the mid-1980’s and late 1990’s. Having a good economy, Malaysia has become the target of immigrants (mostly illegal) from its neighboring countries such as Indonesia, Philippines, Vietnam, and even Nepal.

The earliest economy of Malaysia was based on mining and agriculture. Most of the economic wealth of Malaysia at that time came from the extensive rubber plantations in the central and southern states and from the tin mining industry located largely in the northwest part of the country (Pye, 1974). During that period of time England and other western countries influenced Malaysia’s economy very strongly. Therefore, the rapid growth of industries (especially automobiles) in those countries created an extremely large demand of tin and rubber, which Malaysia produced.

In the 1970’s Malaysia committed itself to changing the economy from mining and agriculture to manufacturing. The manufacturing sector increased from 13.4% in the 1970’s to 30% in late 1990’s. Mahathir’s industrialization in the early 1980’s played a very important role in this rapid growth of manufacturing, which contributes to Malaysia’s economy up to now. Besides succeeding in reducing corruption, Mahathir’s salient economic strategy at that time was building a strong collaboration with China, Korea, Japan and Taiwan. His famous slogan was “Look to the East.” (Neher et al., 1995; Laothamat, 1997). However, this strategy was not durable, as in the mid-1980’s Malaysia was struck by painful inflation that made Malaysia open its economic networks to western economic actors.

The federal government has played a very important role in Malaysia’s economy since 1955. After the 13th May Incident, Malaysia implemented the famous NEP (New Economic Program) as its main economic policy, which allowed state intervention in a large area of the economy. The main goal of NEP was affirmative action for “economic distribution” to the bumiputera (Malays and other native Malaysian),
to lift up the bumiputeras economic ownership from 2.5% in 1970’s to 30% in 1990’s. The 1991’s data showed that it achieved 20% (Neher et al., 1995, p. 100) which was under the target, yet decent. Until the 1980’s NEP became “the way of life” of Malaysians (Laothamatas, 1997, p. 61). Malaysia also has the Economic Planning Unit at the federal level which is responsible for “preparing policies and strategies for socio-economic development, preparing medium and long term plans for the government, and most importantly, advising the government on economic issues.”

**Thailand**

In contrast to Malaysia, Thailand is the most homogeneous country in Southeast Asia. The homogeneity is not only in terms of ethnicity (Thais 75%), but also religion (Buddhism 95%) and language (Tai 85%) (Quah, 1978). Like Malaysia where the diversity of ethnic cleavages created a lack of ideological debate in political realm, Thailand follows the same path. The ethnic homogeneity does not make the political configuration more ideological or class based. Therefore, one still witness the pragmatism of politics in a homogeneous country, of which Thailand is one of the best examples.

This does not mean however that there are no class dynamics within the country at all. In ancient times, Thailand had only two main classes: the monarch families and the people. But after 1932, when the country radically changed from monarchy to parliamentary democracy, Thai society was divided into three categories: the upper class (comprised of royalty, military generals, high ranking civil servants, wealthy businessmen, and elder academics), the middle class (young educated people and middle level workers), and the third, the biggest group, the lower class (farmers, fishermen and laborers) (Mahmood, 1994). Based on this situation, there are three aspects which are important to elaborate on, in order to analyze democracy and economic development in Thailand: the kingship and its impact in contemporary politics, the military - civil relationship, and the economic history.

The first aspect is monarchy and its legacies. It could be said that Thailand is the strongest monarchy in the region. Many scholars have mentioned the greatness of the country, showing the fact that Thailand is the only country that had never been colonized throughout its history (Waddell, 1972; Peleggi, 2007). More interestingly, it was not because of the power of its military force, the power of diplomacy was the strongest determining aspect instead.

There were two kings that were very important in Thailand’s history: King Mongkut (Rama V) and his successor King Chulalongkorn. King Mongkut, who was in power from 1851 to 1868, had very tremendous global insight. He used English as his second language; he also learned Latin, mathematics and astronomy from a western teacher, Bishop Pallegoi, and studied political movements in Europe and the U.S (Waddell, 1972, p. 27; Quah, 1978, p. 20). These skills enabled him to have a good relationship, both in business and politics, with westerners. King Chulalongkorn, in power from 1868 to 1910, made this transformation of accepting western world even faster. The biggest step that he made was the modernization of many aspects of Thailand including economic and social (Waddell, 1972, p. 28). The most important impact of his movement was the emergence of the young educated generation a couple decades later.

In 1932, a bloodless coup d’etat was carried out by Thailand’s military, which radically changed the government system from an absolute monarchy to a parliamentary system and constitutional monarchy. Even though the monarch system was overthrown, the power of the king is still strong in Thailand’s politics. Until the 2006 Constitution of Thailand, the king’s approval was still required for certain level decisions. Moreover, Thais still admire royal family as the high class family. This is also one reason why Thais are tolerant to military coups and feel comfortable with a military regime. (Neher et al., 1995; Srinivasan, 2006).

The second aspect is the discussion of military coups and democracy. According to Srinivasan (2006) the number of elections and military coups is almost the same throughout Thailand’s history. There have been eighteen elections in Thailand since 1933 as well as eighteen military coups. There is a long history of a civil-military relationship in Thailand and “it should be noted that since 1932 when the absolute monarchy was abolished, the military has been the backbone of the state.” (Laothamatas, 1997, p. 142).

Right after the 1932 revolution, the basic idea of the new government was based on democracy. That was why Phraya Manopakorn Nitiadat was appointed to become the first prime minister of Thailand. Even though he spent only a year in power, before being defeated by the first military coup, Phraya put the fundamentals of democracy in Thailand, which was shown by the first 1933 election. Phraya was the first leader of Thailand who was strongly motivated to implement democracy (Quah, 1978; Peleggi, 2007). Military coups in Thailand have been occasional after that first coup in 1932. The main reason for military coups has been either corruption, national stability, economic depression, or communist threat.

In terms of its economic development among Southeast Asian countries, Thailand has been famous for its agricultural products. Thailand’s produced commodities such as rice, fruit, and vegetables occupy the agricultural trade in the region. These commodities played an important role in the economy of ancient Thailand in the monarch era. In the King Mongkut era, the products started to be sold internationally. He imported advisers from the West, encouraged the development of businesses, and started these export activities (Quah, 1978). Since then, the economy of the country became stronger and this was the fundamental capital of the first government after the revolution of 1932.

The highest economic growth that Thailand has ever achieved was in the mid-1980s under Prem’s administration. The economic growth was 9.4% to 10% until the Asian crisis struck the country in 1997. Prem’s strategy at the time was to put the economy of Thailand more widely into the world market. Large amounts of foreign direct investment streamed into the country as the main impact of the policy. This move-
ment went hand in hand with industrialization, which made Thailand one of the largest producers of automobile and electronic products in Southeast Asia. Tourism has also generated a huge income for the country.

Philippines

Many scholars have agreed that Philippines is the oldest democratic country (the first election in Philippines was in 1935) in Southeast Asia (Pye, 1974; Mahmood, 1994; Neher et al., 1995). Due to its language (Spanish and English are largely spoken) and religion (Philippines is the only Christian country in the region), Philippines is also known as the most “western” culture in Southeast Asia. However, this situation does not automatically imply that all good things about democracy and liberal ideas are also happening in the country, the same as in the western world. Laothamatas (1997) called this country a “democratic yet corrupt” country, while, Mahmood (1994) and Abinales (2005) might categorize it as a “pragmatism democracy.” There are four important aspects of Philippines regarding democracy and economic development. The first is that class has been playing a very important role in the Philippine political-economic history. The second is the U.S. influence in the country’s political institutions after independence in 1946. The third is Marcos and the rise of “people power” in the mid-1980’s. The fourth is the history of Philippine economic performance.

The first aspect is class society. Class is the most important Spanish legacy in Philippines. Pre-hispanic society in Philippines was only composed of kinship-groups (barangays) whose head was the datu. Along with Christianization, in which the Spanish gave a lot of power to churches, the Spanish also “imported the concept of private ownership of land and strengthened the position of datus by allowing them to take over the ownership of the hitherto communally-owned barangay lands,” (Waddell, 1972, p. 230). This was the main cause of class creation in Philippines, in which mainly the elites are church leaders and the datus. Today, the offspring of these people are Philippines’ main elite, both in politics and economics.

Implanting democracy in a class society can create many unexpected results, especially when changes through democratic institutions only occur among the elite class. This is what Neher and Marlay (1995) call a “façade democracy” in which lies the fundamental fact that Philippine society was driven by extreme class differences. A few self-aggrandizing rich families controlled every facet of the society.

The second aspect is the U.S. Influence. The U.S. “formally” colonized Philippines from 1902 to 1946, yet the strong influence of the U.S. in Philippines institutions still lasts. One proof of this statement is that “Philippines was governed from 1935 until 1972 under U.S.-inspired Constitution, which was in the most respects a close copy of the Constitution of the United States.” (Neher et al., 1995, p. 52). The “Americanization” did not stop there. The Singaporean leader Lee Kwan Yew in 1992 criticized Philippines for adopting an American-style democracy system, which he claimed was the most disputatious and difficult to manage (Laothamatas, 1997). In recent times, the most important evidence of the U.S. influence in The Philippine politics was in 2004 when a Filipino truck driver was kidnapped by Iraqi militant who demanded the withdrawal of The Philippine troops from Iraq, where they formed part of the U.S.-led coalition (Abinales, 2005).

The third is the rise of people power. In the post-Marcos era, Philippines experienced its most democratic era under Corazon Aquino (1986-1992) and Fidel Ramos (1992-1998). However, the period after the “Post-Marcos” era, another “people power” was held again on January 2001 in order to remove Joseph Estrada (1998-2001) from his presidency, because of the problems with a bad economy, drug smuggling, and illegal gambling (jueteng).

In his era, Philippines’ politics were heavily based on media and popularity based. There were many celebrities, sports stars, and TV reporters who became politicians just because of their popularity (Abinales, 2005, p. 272). Based on The Philippine Constitution, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, who was Estrada’s vice president, automatically became the president. In order to win the election in 2004, Arroyo used the more sophisticated political strategies which seemed to abolish the “media populism” politics. Arroyo depended heavily on the electoral machinery of her coalition of political allies nationwide. Her campaign strategy also “involved unbridled access to government resources, the hiring of expert pollster, brilliant use of opinion surveys, a deal with a popular TV personality and innovation to try and test campaign devices” (Abinales, 2005, p. 283). This new situation does not mean the “people power” is totally diminished as the political culture. For instance, in 2004, about 30,000 people, of which Corazon Aquino was a part, went to the street in Manila demanding Arroyo’s step down (BBC 7/13/2005).

The economic development performance of Philippines was quite stable before Marcos’ era. Even during the first term of Marcos, the economic performance was strong, but when looking over his whole regime, it was not characterized by strong economic growth. According to the World Bank data real growth in GDP per capita averaged 3.5% from 1951 to 1965, while under the Marcos regime (1966 to 1986), annual average growth was only 1.4% and it became negative afterwards. To help finance a number of economic development projects, such as infrastructure, the Marcos government engaged in borrowing money, yet that money ended up corrupted (Neher et al., 1995). Therefore, Marcos was not only a political milestone in The Philippine history but also the economic one.

Post-Marcos, a democratic era flourished and the economy slowly but surely recovered. In the Aquino era, the poverty rate declined from 59% in 1985 to 49.9 % in 1988. Unemployment was reduced by 4% until 1992. Economic growth increased by 5.95% annually from 1987-1989 (Laothamatas, 1997).

Theoretical Framework

The relationship between democracy and economic development can happen in two ways (Almond, 1991). However,
this paper only focuses on one direction, which is how economic development affects democracy. The term economic development is used in this paper to differ from economic liberalism and modernization. The five economic indicators used (GDP growth, GNI per capita, foreign investment, inflation, and trade) are not necessarily products of liberalism or modernization but no one could argue that those indicators do not reflect economic development. There are three groups of scholars in the context of economic development affecting democracy.

The first group is of those who believe that economic development has a strong effect on promoting democracy. (Fish, 2005), for instance, after running a test of the correlation between economic development (Economic Freedom Index/EFI) and political openness (Voice and Accountability/VA) argues that economic development has a positive statistical significance to democracy, and this is a universal phenomenon. (Bellin, 2000) emphasized the more indirect effect of economic development on democracy. The direct effects of economic development are wealth, reducing inequality, mobility of capital, etc. Those effects create actors who eventually will promote democracy.

The second group is of scholars who believe in the contingent aspect. Kwon (2004) and Mainwaring and Perez-Linan (2003) explicitly state that Latin America is the exception of all findings of economic development contributing to democracy. In terms of emphasizing the contingent aspect of the theory, Przeworski and Limongi did not specifically mention specific regions or countries, rather they categorized impacts based on economic level. They argued that “democracy is more likely to survive in growing economy with less than $1,000 per capita income than in a country with the income between $1,000 and $2,000 that declines economically.” (Przeworski & Limongi, 1997, p. 177).

The third is Boix (2003) who argued that economic development potentially creates both democratic and undemocratic regimes. He argued that economic development could create two kinds of situations, and these kinds of situations could also create different levels of democracy. If economic development results in wealth, equality, social mobility, and society-directed politics, then, economic development promotes democracy. On the contrary, if economic development creates only few people who become very rich, social immobility, and a state-directed government (this is as same as what Laohamatas (1997) said), economic development promotes authoritarianism.

This paper mainly focuses on testing the second group of scholars who believe in the positive effect of economic development on democracy. The question is whether or not the contingencies only exist in the regional context or income levels. Obviously, testing the second group also implies that the first group of scholars are also tested in this paper.

Methodology

In order to measure the level of democracy, there are two independent variables in this research paper, which are Political Right (PR) and Civil Liberty (CL). Data for those two variables are taken form Freedom House (www.freedomhouse.org) under “Freedom in the World Historical Rankings Comparative Scores for all countries from 1973 to 2006.” The data are ranked from 1 to 7, indicating that 1 is very democratic and 7 is very undemocratic in both variables. For instance, if one country has 1 in PR it simply means that the country has a high level of political rights.

The economic indicators used in this research as the dependent variables are GDP growth, GNI per capita, foreign investment, inflation rate, and trade. Data for those variables are taken from World Bank under “WDI, GDF, and ADI Online databases” and select WDI (World Development Index) dataset. Time series data for all variables are used from 1973 to 2006.

Therefore, the regression equations for the two independent variables for each country are:

\[ Y_{PRi} = \beta_0 + \beta_{FDIi} + \beta_{GDPi} + \beta_{GNIi} + \beta_{HI} + \beta_{TRDi} + \epsilon_i \]

\[ Y_{CLI} = \beta_0 + \beta_{FDIi} + \beta_{GDPi} + \beta_{GNIi} + \beta_{HI} + \beta_{TRDi} + \epsilon_i \]

Data Analysis

The goal of this paper is to test the theory of economic development contribution to democracy. The question is how the regression equations give the same/different results in the three countries observed. In order to do the comparison study, the paper will only focus on two aspects of the statistical analysis results: the R^2 and the coefficients.

Comparing the R^2 is helpful to understand the difference of economic development and democratic interactions between countries studied. The statistical test found that the R^2’s for PR are: Malaysia (0.83), Philippines (0.61), and Thailand (0.55). While the R^2’s for CL are: Malaysia (0.45), Philippines (0.53), and Thailand (0.33).

The model is only good for estimating PR in Malaysia, but not for the rest equations. From the historical description we have seen that the political economic situation in each country is very different. In Malaysia the reason that the economic indicators have become a good predictor for political right (PR) is because political change and economic development can go hand in hand because of the strong alliance in the Barisan Nasional. Massive popular support from rural people to BN and critical support from urban people has promoted this correlation. This situation is not happening in the other two countries. Strong yet inclusive government is not the case in Thailand, while in Philippines it happened in the Fidel Ramos era but not in the regimes after him. This difference is proven by the big gap of the R2s between the three countries.

In general, the model is better when used to predict democracy in the sense of political right (PR), rather than civil liberties (CL) as the R^2s of CL are smaller in comparison to the R^2s for PR. The R^2s of CL are more similar among the countries, yet in small numbers. It means that all three countries experience the same thing, that economic development is not a good predictor for civil liberty.
The second step is to compare the coefficients. The equations that resulted from the regression tests are:

(a) Malaysia:

\[ Y_{PRm} = 1.65_{0m} + 2.38_{FDIm} - 0.018_{GDPm} \\
-0.0006_{GNIm} - 0.028_{Im} + 0.027_{TRDm} + \epsilon_m \]

\[ Y_{CLm} = 3.31_{0m} - 2.6 \times 10^{-10}_{FDIm} + 0.368_{GDPm} \\
+0.0003_{GNIm} - 0.05_{Im} + 0.006_{TRDm} + \epsilon_m \]

(b) Philippines

\[ Y_{PRp} = 5.2_{0p} - 4.03 \times 10^{10}_{FDIp} + 0.05_{GDPp} \\
-0.001_{GNIp} + 0.01_{Ip} - 0.02_{TRDP} + \epsilon_p \]

\[ Y_{CLp} = 4.64_{0p} - 2.8 \times 10^{10}_{FDIp} + 0.09_{GDPp} \\
-0.001_{GNIp} + 0.02_{Ip} - 0.005_{TRDP} + \epsilon_p \]

(c) Thailand

\[ Y_{PRt} = 3.5_{0t} + 8.9 \times 10^{11}_{FDIt} + 0.05_{GDPt} \\
-8.6 \times 10^{-5}_{GNIt} + 0.15_{It} - 0.022_{TRDt} + \epsilon_t \]

\[ Y_{CLt} = 4.07_{0t} - 4.3 \times 10^{11}_{FDIt} + 0.03_{GDPt} \\
+9.93 \times 10^{-5}_{GNIt} + 0.015_{It} - 0.01_{TRDt} + \epsilon_t \]

From these equations we can see that the economic indicators gave different impacts in the three countries. Coefficients with the negative signs mean that the economic indicators contribute positively to democracy, as the scale of \( Y \) variable is 1 (most democratic) and 7 (most undemocratic). Therefore, further analysis will focus on comparing the negative signs between the three countries; keep in mind that only in Malaysia – the PR the equation has a big \( R^2 \).

For political right (PR), in Malaysia the three predictors that contribute positively to democracy are GDP, GNI, and Inflation, for Philippines, they are foreign investment, GNI, and trade, whereas for Thailand, only GNI and trade have negative signs. For civil liberty (CL), Malaysia has foreign investment and inflation, Philippines has foreign investment, GNI, and trade, while Thailand has foreign investment and trade that have negative signs.

For Malaysia, having a strong economic relationship with developed eastern countries (e.g., Japan, Korea, China and Taiwan) is probably one of the reasons why trade and foreign investment do not impact the political right so much (PR). The domestic political situation does not affect the international business relations in Malaysia. This is not the case in Thailand and Philippines, where trade, especially international economic relations, in both countries, play important roles in terms of causing the change in PR. However, the GNI variable constantly appears to promote political rights in all countries.

In the civil liberty aspect, Philippines has the most dependent variables that promote democracy, which are: foreign investment, GNI, and trade. According to its political history, Philippines has the highest level of civil liberties not only among the three countries studied, but also in Southeast Asia in general. In addition, its economic and political fluctuations have gone hand in hand. For instance, in the Marcos era, the economy and the civil liberty were both in a very bad situation, while in the Ramos era both were in good shape. Although foreign investment in all countries affects the promotion of civil liberty, the other economic indicators still reacted differently.

However, the difference of how the model reacts in the three countries is bigger than the similarities. Further research to explain why those differences occur is needed. But, for the purpose of this paper, which wants to see how economic development differently affects democracy from country to country, what the data and findings show is enough.

Conclusion

Based on the history, political configuration, and economic performance explanation of the three countries studied, there is no need to make any generalization about them, or Southeast Asia in general. Malaysia, with strong ethnic cleavages, Philippines, which has strong class cleavages, and Thailand, the most homogenous society, all have their own specific problems, especially regarding their political economic situations.

The model of how economic development (GDP, GNI per capita, foreign investment, inflation, and trade) affects democracy (political right and civil liberty) works differently in those three countries. Again, this is proof of how universalism (Fish and Bellin) and regionalism (Kwon, Przeworski and Limongi and Mainwaring and Perez-Linan) do not apply in Southeast Asia and how the indicators change.

Nevertheless, there are some needs for further studies, especially to find out why the model works surprisingly differently in all three countries. Future studies may also find the reason why GNI works consistently in predicting political right but not civil liberty, and, why foreign investment has become a good predictor for civil liberty in three countries, but not for political rights. Making a new model that employs more dependent variables would also be interesting for future research, in order to find the pattern of relationships between economic development and democracy, especially in an extremely diverse region such as Southeast Asia.

References


**Short Bio of Fadilah Putra:** He has written twelve books about decentralization and public policy in Indonesia and also has actively engaged in leading an NGO called Averroes Community. Currently, he is teaching at the Department of Public Administration Brawijaya University, Indonesia.

He was awarded a scholarship from International Fellowship Program (IFP) by Ford Foundation to pursue a master’s degree at Lyndon B. Johnson School University of Texas at Austin, Texas, USA from 2007-2009.

He presented a paper “Border Conflicts: Are we getting closer together or further apart?” at Society for Public Policy and Planning University of Texas at Austin, 17 April 2008. He participated in the 21st Winter Course di Andalo, Italy, from January 6 through 13, 2008 about “Fighting Terrorism, Protecting Human Rights” sponsored by Pugwash International. His recent international publication article is titled “Crisis Management in Public Administration” published in Journal of Community and Regional Planning Vol 13/14 2009, School of Architecture, University of Texas at Austin.